

#### You Can't Secure Your Software Supply Chain Without a Pipeline





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## **LET'S GET STARTED!**

## WHY CI/CD SECURITY?

The shift left has happened so our pipelines are secure... right... maybe... ugh...





## **SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY**

# The "New Kid On The Block..."





#### **CREEPER WORM...**



#### I'M THE CREEPER. CATCH ME IF YOU CAN!





#### WHY ARE WE SO VULNERABLE?





#### **LET'S DO THE MATH...**

## 99%

## 85%





#### **SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY ATTACKS ARE HAPPENING**

#### THERE WAS A BLANK% INCREASE IN SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACKS IN 2021





#### **SOFTWARE IS UNDER ATTACK!**

#### Common Attack





Supply Chain Attack





VS

#### WHY ATTACK THE SUPPLY CHAIN?





#### **TYPES OF SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY ATTACKS**

- Known Vulnerabilities
  - publicly disclosed security bugs
- Unknown Vulnerablities Zero Day Attacks
  - attack on a vulnerability that was not identified and fixed in time to prevent the attack
- Non-Code Issues
  - human error can lead to malicious software injection attacks



#### **10 YEARS 6 MASSIVE ATTACKS!**





#### **STUXNET 2010**

- Computer worm infected over 200,000 computers
- caused 1,000 machines to physically degrade
- exploited 4 Zero Day vulnerabilities





#### **TARGET 2013**

- Malware was placed on POS (point of sale) machines through their HVAC company
- 40 million credit and debit cards details stolen
- \$18.5 million in settlement claims
- Target estimates a \$202 million loss





#### ATM MALWARE 2014

- Multiple varieties but all do the same thing...
- Magnetic strip can be compromised

   you need an insider to put the
   malware on the machine
- Exploited Windows 32-Bit operating system letting attackers see how much money is in each machine and 'withdraw' 40 notes





#### **NOTPETYA 2017**

- Targeted Ukraine energy companies, the power grid, bus stations, gas stations, the airport, and banks!
- A patch M.E.Doc was used as the backdoor to infect the companies
- New iteration of Petya (2016) a ransomware attack - Notpetya asked for low level ransom but the goal was to infect computers and not collect money





#### **BRITISH AIRWAYS 2018**

- Infected the payment screen and rerouted customers to different website where attackers stole consumer info
- 380,000 customers credit cards COMPROMISED



• £183 million fine



#### **SOLARWINDS 2020**

- Windows OS attack
- 18,000 customers infected including the United States'
  - Department of Homeland Security
  - National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
  - Department of Commerce
- Average cost to companies infected \$12 Million



"Eighteen thousand [customers] was our best estimate of who may have downloaded the code between March and June of 2020."

-Sudhakar Ramakrishna, SolarWinds President & CEO



#### **PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE**





#### WHAT DOES THIS HAVE TO DO WITH THE CDF?

The Continuous Delivery Foundation supports various continuous delivery open source and standards projects, including infrastructure and support initiatives.



#### CD.FOUNDATION



https://github.com/cdfoundation/charter/blob/main/CHARTER.md

#### WHAT DOES THIS HAVE TO DO WITH THE CDF?

- WHAT DO WE BELIEVE IN...
  - producing high quality software more rapidly
  - collectively addressing the whole software delivery lifecycle
- POWER OF COMMUNITY BUILDING
  - sustaining open-source, vendor neutral projects
  - collaboration among practitioners to share and improve their practices





#### **CDF PROJECTS OVERVIEW**



GRADUATED













## ((())) cdevents



#### WHERE DOES SECURITY FIT INTO THE CDF?





## 



# **PVRSI**

#### *DECENTRALIZED PACKAGE* NETWORK

#### Try the Pyrsia Demo >

# Pyrsia sets out to be the torch that lights up the open-source supply chain.



#### WHAT DO WE WANT IN OUR SUPPLY CHAIN







RELIABLE

SECURE







### **PYRSIA BINARY DISTRIBUTION NETWORK**

https://github.com/pyrsia

Decentralized Package Registry P2P Package Downloads Multi-node Verification of Source Builds







#### **IMMUTABLE TRANSPARENCY LEDGER**











Frog

#### WE NEED MORE SECURITY PROJECTS













## **THANK YOU!**