



Keyless Signing with Tekton and Sigstore

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September, 2022

About Me




Chainguard

- Staff Software Engineer @ Chainguard
- Maintainer for:
 - [tektoncd/chains](https://github.com/tektoncd/chains)
 - [sigstore/gitsign](https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign)


Previously:

- Cloud Build
- Cloud Source Repositories
- Google Code

Software supply chain attacks increased 650% in 2021.



<https://www.sonatype.com/resources/state-of-the-software-supply-chain-2021>



A Submit unauthorized change

B Compromise source repo

C Build from modified source

D Compromise build process

E Use compromised dependency

F Upload modified package

G Compromise package repo

H Use compromised package

Supply chain Levels for Software Artifacts, or SLSA (salsa).

The industry road map for software supply chain integrity.

slsa.dev




SLSA



OpenSSF

OPEN SOURCE SECURITY FOUNDATION

SLSA Levels



Level 1	Easy to adopt, giving you supply chain visibility and being able to generate provenance
Level 2	Starts to protect against software tampering and adds minimal build integrity guarantees
Level 3	Hardens the infrastructure against attacks, more trust integrated into complex systems
Level 4	The highest assurances of build integrity and measures for dependency management in place


Provenance requirements

Requirements on the process by which provenance is generated and consumed:

Requirement	Description	L1	L2	L3	L4
Available	The provenance is available to the consumer in a format that the consumer accepts.	✓	✓	✓	✓
Authenticated	The provenance's authenticity and integrity can be verified by the consumer.		✓	✓	✓
Service generated	The data in the provenance MUST be obtained from the build service.		✓	✓	✓
Non-falsifiable	Provenance cannot be falsified by the build service's users.			✓	✓
Dependencies complete	Provenance records all build dependencies that were available while running the build steps.				✓



<https://tekton.dev>



sigstore


<https://sigstore.dev>

Tekton

Cloud Native CI/CD



```
apiVersion: tekton.dev/v1beta1
kind: Task
metadata:
  name: hello
spec:
  steps:
  - name: echo
    image: distroless.dev/alpine-base
    script: |
      echo "Hello World!"
```




Demo




Tekton Chains

- Observes your Tekton TaskRuns and PipelineRuns, automatically signs:
 - Build configuration
 - Images
- Runs in a different namespace separate from user code.
- Supports Sigstore keyless mode w/ Cosign signatures!




sigstore

- Three main components:
 - **Tooling:** Developer tooling for signing software using Rekor and Fulcio (i.e. cosign, gitsign, etc.)
 - **Rekor:** Public transparency log for supply chain metadata
 - **Fulcio:** Free, OpenID Connect based Certificate Authority




Sigstore Adoption

Star History



Extremely excited about this. The npm team has been collaborating with GitHub's package security team for months putting together an RFC to improve the audibility and trust of npm packages using SigStore and trusted build infrastructure




github.blog
New request for comments on improving npm security: Supply chain attacks exploit our implicit trust of our packages and our customers. Read our proposal for how npm

We are currently running the first Kubernetes image promotion which will become the first signed release and verifiable in the [@projectsigstore](#) transparency log


[From Kubernetes With ❤️ Open Tools For Open, Secure Supply Chains - Adolfo García Veytia](#)

Tuesday, September 13 • 09:00 - 09:40

Sigstore - Keyless Signing



Sigstore - Keyless Signing



Demo

What's next



Non-falsifiability

- Trusted resources
- SPIFFE/SPIRE

SLSA Level 4

- Hermetic builds
- More artifact types



- Sigstore GA
- More artifact types
 - Git, RubyGems, PyPI, npm, Rust crates, Java, ...
- Enforcement - Policy controllers, etc.

How to get involved

- [Tekton Community](#)
- [Tekton Working Groups](#)
 - [Supply Chain Security](#)
 - [Chains](#)
- [Sigstore Community](#)
- [SLSA Community](#)
- OpenSSF Working Groups
 - [Supply Chain Integrity](#)
 - [Securing Software Repositories](#)

Thanks!



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github.com/wlynch



<https://tekton.dev>



<https://sigstore.dev>



<https://slsa.dev>



sigstore

gitsign

[Gitsign – Keyless Git Commit Signing - Billy Lynch](#)

Wednesday, September 14 • 15:15 - 15:55